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Abstract
How does the productivity of a commune compare with that of a conventional
firm? This paper addresses this question quantitatively by focusing on the history
of a religious commune called the United Society of Believers, better known as
the Shakers. We utilize the information recorded in the enumeration schedules of
the US Manufacturing and Agriculture Censuses, available for the period between
1850 to 1880, to estimate the productivities of Shaker shops and farms. From the
same data source, we also construct random samples of other shops and farms and
estimate their productivities for comparison with the Shakers. Our results provide
support to the contention that communes need not always suffer from reduced
productivity. Shaker farms and shops generally performed just as productively as
their neighbors; when differences did exist between their productivities, there are
good reasons to attribute them to factors other than organizational form.
1.
Productivity of a Commune: The Shakers, 1850-80
How does the productivity of a commune compare with that of a conventional firm?
Unlike a conventional firm, a commune distributes output to its members according to rules, such
as equal sharing, that do not depend on members’ effort.  Because this independence between
income and effort creates a potential for an incentive problem, those who emphasize the role of
incentives on productivity would argue that, all else being equal, a conventional firm should be
more productive than a commune.  Those who consider the presumptions of the standard theory
as being inapplicable to communes, on the other hand, would argue that work incentives in a
commune, shaped by such things as communal work ethic and interdependence, are adequate to
prove a commune to be just as productive, if not more, as a conventional firm.
These arguments about comparative productivity are ultimately quantitative, of course.
But it is also very difficult to isolate and quantify the effect of organizational forms on
productivity, because one needs to control for all other factors that might also be affecting
productivity simultaneously.  For example, one has to compare units that use similar inputs and
produce similar products, or be able to control for the differences in the amounts and
compositions of inputs and outputs.  Difficulties of meeting such conditions might explain the
discrepancies in the reported results of comparisons of alternative organizational forms1.
This paper aims to test quantitatively these arguments about the comparative performance
of communes and conventional firms by focusing on the history of a religious commune called the
United Society of Believers, better known as the Shakers.  For this purpose, we use the
information recorded in the enumeration schedules of the US Manufacturing and Agriculture
Censuses available for the period between 1850 to 1880.  We first identify the Shaker entries in
2.
the schedules and then choose a random sample of other farms and manufacturing establishments
for a comparison based on consistent data.  Because the comparison sample is drawn from the
schedules of the same townships as the Shakers, these neighboring farms and shops faced similar
local constraints.  We estimate the average productivities of the two groups of producers, identify
and control for consistent non-organizational differences between them that might have affected
effect their relative productivities, and assess the role of organizational differences.
Communes and Their Productivity
A commune is a collection of individuals who own property in common and whose
personal shares of the gains from cooperative efforts are determined not by contribution to
production but according to needs or by some other rule such as equal distribution of output
among members.  Members of a commune typically unite under a common ideology or a religious
belief and seek to benefit from the joint pursuit of the prescribed goals.  Some of the well-known
examples of communes are the Hutterite colonies, the kibbutzim of Israel, and the historical
American communities like the Shakers and the Amana Colonies.
Independence of income from effort in a commune appears to present a classic example of
an incentive problem in production.  Because the incremental revenue produced by additional
effort is not directly reflected in a member's income, work incentives in a commune might be
inadequate.  Each member of the commune would have an incentive to choose suboptimal levels
of effort and "free-ride" on the efforts of others.  Suboptimal levels of effort by all members
would then result in an inefficient level of total output produced by the commune.  The standard
                                                                                                                                                    
1.  See, for example, the discussion in Bonin and Putterman (1987, p. 119-43).
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incentive theory would thus lead us to expect a commune to be less productive than comparable
conventional firms that determine income directly from effort.
One might also argue, however, that the problem posed by the standard decision theory
rests on certain presumptions about human motivation and interaction that are not necessarily
true, at least not for communes.  Two groups of factors have been argued to lead potentially to a
different conclusion about comparative performance. The first is at the level of preferences.  For
example, as Sen (1966) argues, members of a commune might be altruistic, in which case each
member's concern for the welfare of others would increase his or her incentives to work hard.
Similarly, one might also argue that members of a commune may actually have a more positive
attitude toward work itself.  Because communes, unlike private firms, attract individuals to a
strong ideology or religious belief which often views work as good or even as worship, a self-
selection mechanism might ensure that only hard workers join the commune2. The possibility of
such preferences would imply that communes need not have an incentive problem and produce
inefficiently.
The second group of factors affect incentives through social interaction, even under the
conventional assumptions about preferences.  For example, as Putterman (1983) argues, even
self-interested behavior can actually result in an equilibrium of high incentives in a commune if the
effort decisions of members are interdependent (contrary to independence typically assumed in the
standard incentive theory).  That is, if one's choice of effort strategically considers its effect on the
effort choices of others, then it might be individually and socially optimal to establish a norm of
hard work within the commune.  Similarly, peer pressure and various social factors such as shame,
                                                 
2.  But self-selection can also work in the opposite direction if the commune does not or cannot carefully scrutinize
the actual intentions of potential entrants.  That is, individuals might join not for ideological or religious reasons
but simply to improve their living standards.  See Murray(1995).
4.
guilt, and mutual monitoring might interact to create internal incentives to work hard in a
commune3.
Going beyond the standard incentive theory, one can thus find reasons to expect
communes to be just as productive as conventional firms.  Which, then, is the more correct view
of the productivity of a commune: less productive than others as implied by the standard theory,
or equally productive as implied by alternative approaches?  The issue is ultimately quantitative.
It can only be determined by measuring the productivities of specific communes and by comparing
them with the productivities of comparable conventional firms.
There are surprisingly few systematic studies that address quantitatively the comparative
productivity of communes and conventional firms.  An ideal quantitative comparison requires
isolating conventional firms that are identical, or at least similar, to communes in all non-
organizational respects.  It also requires reliable and consistent (e.g., same variables, based on the
same recording conventions) data for both the communes and the comparable units.  Data
limitations make such an ideal comparison very difficult.  Therefore, quantitative studies of
productivity tend to use data sets that consist of only communes and either make no comparisons
with conventional firms or estimate the productivity of a particular commune and then compare it
with the productivity estimate of some aggregate of conventional firms often available from
another source.  As an example of the first, Putterman (1990) examines the role of material
incentives on effort and productivity in a 1970s Chinese People's commune.  As an example of the
second, Barkai (1977: 123-37) estimates the total factor productivity of kibbutz production
                                                 
3.  See Kandel and Lazear (1992) for a discussion of these issues in the context of partnerships and Weitzman and
Kruse (1990) in the context of worker-management and profit-sharing programs, which are also applicable to
communes.  Elinor Ostrom and others find that common property arrangements work best for small, relatively
homogenous groups who share similar beliefs and objectives.  See Ostrom (1990) and Keohane and Ostrom (1995).
See also Roehl (1972) for a case study of the effects of religious ideology on labor effort.
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branches and compares the result with the same measure for the comparable sectors of the Israeli
economy.  He argues that "we may say that kibbutzim did no worse in terms of productivity gains
than the Israeli private non-dwelling economy as a whole, and very probably did better."(Barkai
1977: 136)  This conclusion does not seem very convincing, however, because it is based on
different types of data and an insufficiently particular comparison.  Such a comparison is too
general to control for many of the factors, such as size, products, and market conditions, that
might have also affected productivities4.  A more convincing study must isolate comparable
conventional firms, use data from the same source, and control for non-organizational differences.
This paper aims to fulfill this task by focusing on the Shakers.  We estimate the
productivities of farms and manufacturing enterprises in Shaker communes and compare them
with the productivities of a random sample of other farmers and manufacturers in the same areas.
For both the Shakers and others, we use the same source of information: the US Census
enumeration schedules.  Census information also allows us to examine the role of other
differences that might have affected productivity.
The Shakers and Observations on Their Productivity
As a Christian communal society, the Shakers were well-known for their commitments to
celibacy, common property, and communal distribution of output (Stein 1992).  By the year 1800,
they numbered 1373 and maintained eleven communities in New York and New England (Brewer
1986).  In 1850, US Census recorded the greatest number of Shakers, when 3842 members lived
in twenty one communities located between Maine and Kentucky (Bainbridge 1982).
                                                 
4.  Similar problems exist in the empirical studies of comparative productivity concerning other organizational
forms.  See Bonin, et al (1993: 1302-07) for a review of these difficulties in the literature on producer cooperatives.
6.
Shaker communalism evolved gradually.  The Shakers of the late 1770s and early 1780s
retained their privately owned property after joining.  Communalism was initiated in the winter of
1782-1783: "The time is come to give up yourselves and your all to God--your substance, your
temporal property--to possess as though you possessed not.  We shall have one meeting
together," wrote James Whittaker, a prominent Elder (Andrews 1963: 48).  The first community
covenant of 1795 called for members to give all their worldly property to the "Joint interest of the
Church," in which "all should have Just and Equal rights and Privileges, according to their
needs...without Any difference being made on account of what any of us brought in."  (Andrews
1963: 62).
Each Shaker community consisted of several semi-autonomous subdivisions of communes,
called "families," units ranging in size from about ten to more than one hundred persons5.  The
basic unit of social interaction for each Shaker was the family commune, which was also the basic
economic unit. Each commune typically developed a mixed economy of agricultural production
and several manufacturing enterprises.  Some Shaker products, especially chairs, garden seeds,
brooms and brushes, and medicinal herbs and roots, became well-known nationally.
How representative is Shaker communalism in addressing the general relationship between
work-incentives and economic productivity in communes?  It is true that the Shaker communes
were different from Soviet, Chinese, or Yugoslavian operations in terms of, for example, size,
governance, economic structure, and religious and political ideology.  What is more relevant here,
however, is the fundamental similarity in the way all communes typically compensate labor
(creating the potential for incentive problem) and seek to unite members under a common
                                                                                                                                                    
They argue that "[f]rom the few studies that address directly the comparative productivity of [producer
cooperatives] and [conventional firms], no consensus emerges." (p. 1307)
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ideology (creating the potential for high effort).  Although the relative importance of these two
potentials might vary among communes (possibly caused by their differences in terms of size,
governance, and so on), we see this variation as outweighed by the more fundamental difference
between all communes and all conventional firms.  The focus on the Shakers provides an adequate
framework to address whether communes can be as efficient as conventional firms, or to test
whether the arguments of the standard incentive theory or of alternative approaches to human
motivation are more accurate.
The argument of the standard incentive theory is applicable to the Shakers in that the
return to labor was independent of effort.  In each Shaker family, all members worked together in
communal farms and shops.  In return, they had “a just and equal right to the use of things,
according to their order and needs”. (Father Joseph, quoted in Andrews 1963: 62) Thus, rather
than a wage income for labor, they earned the right to consume communal goods, a right which
depended neither on one’s ability to work nor on actual effort.  As Stein (1992: 149) puts it,
“[t]hey ate at the same tables, shared living quarters, slept in the same rooms..., and used the same
sanitary facilities.”  Because of the independence of effort and income, standard incentive theory
would thus predict the Shakers farms and shops to be less productive than other conventional
ones.
The argument of alternative approaches to human motivation is also applicable in that
Shakers principles placed a high value on labor.  An early Shaker didactic formula, attributed to
their foundress, Mother Ann Lee, urged: "Put your hands to work and your hearts to God."
Correspondence and journals of the Shakers provide numerous examples of the importance of this
principle in shaping the Shaker attitude toward work (Gooden 1983; Andrews 1963: 94-135).
                                                                                                                                                    
5.  For an analysis of the Shaker family system, see Coêgel, Miceli, and Murray (1997).
8.
For example, an excerpt from a Shaker writing in 1816 stated: “our labor is to do good, in our
day and generation, to all men, as far as we are able, by faithfulness and frugality in the works of
our hands.”6  Alternative approaches would thus predict the Shakers to be just as productive as
others, and perhaps even more productive.
The question then becomes whether t  Shaker attitude toward work was strong enough
to dominate the incentive problem in the way it affected the performance of their economic
enterprises.  On this issue, observers and historians of the Shakers have almost unanimously
praised the Shaker economy as being very successful, in both manufacturing and agriculture7.
Richard T. Ely, a founder of the American Economic Association, visited the Shakers in 1885 and
wrote: "Economically, the Shakers have been a complete success" (Ely, 1886: 12).  Reviewing the
written comments of the contemporary observers of the Shakers, Andrews (1974: 190) notes that
"the observations of the visitors on the economy of the [Shakers]...were with few exceptions
favorable and often laudatory" (Emphasis original).  Observations on the comparative
performance of the Shakers were equally favorable.  As Andrews reports, "compar[ing] their
condition with that obtaining among contemporary mechanics and agriculturists in the
world...most observers...passed judgments highly favorable to the [Shakers]." 8
Are these observations, especially on comparative performance, accurate and justified?
Although both the general observations and the comparisons of the Shakers with others might be
somewhat reliable in that they are based on first hand observations of the contemporaries, they are
                                                 
6.  Shaker Memorial, 1816, quoted by Andrews (1963: 94).
7.  For an example to the contrary, see Stein (1992: 135-48), who examines the economics of the community
during the middle period (1827-1875) and finds mixed results: expanding prosperity at first, but eventual
difficulties in the latter part of this period as the Shakers increasingly entered "the world of finance capitalism".
8.  Andrews (1974: 194). Emphasis original.  For examples of such comments, see pp. 194-7.  See also Nordhoff
(1875: 390) for a similar comparison, based on his personal observations, of the Shakers with other American
communes.
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not based on a systematic and quantitative study.  Particularly the comparative comments should
be taken as only tentative because they suggest a quantitative difference in performance without
actually providing quantitative support.  Quantitative information about the Shakers and others to
allow such support was not available, of course, to Ely and other contemporary observers of the
Shakers at the time.  Census records make it possible now.
Were the Shakers Equally Productive?
The sources of data for this study are the enumeration schedules of the federal censuses of
population, agriculture, and manufacturing for 1850, 1860, 1870, and 1880.  We first identified all
entries for the Shakers recorded in the agriculture and manufacturing schedules.  Where possible
(i.e., if the families were recorded separately), we used the Shaker family as the unit of analysis;
where we could not find family-level data, we used the entire community as the unit.  The Shakers
were sometimes easy to identify in the schedules when they were recorded simply as, for example,
"Church Family of Shakers."  But sometimes the enumerators entered the information about the
Shakers under the name of one of the Shakers, usually a trustee.  In that case, we relied on our
knowledge of Shaker leadership (based on secondary sources and the Shakers’ own manuscripts)
and also on the names of the Shakers recorded in the population schedules.  In addition to
identifying the Shakers, we constructed random samples of other producers (by randomly
selecting five entries from each township in which the Shakers were recorded in the schedules) for
each of the agriculture and manufacturing censuses for comparison with the Shakers9.  We w re
                                                 
9.  Such a comparison sample makes it possible work with firm-level data, rather than rely solely on the (often
inaccurate) summary information published by the U. S. Census Bureau.  See the Appendix for a discussion of the
way the neighboring farms and shops can represent other conventional producers in the surrounding counties.
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thus able to gather consistent data about the agricultural and manufacturing operations of both the
Shakers and comparable conventional producers.
Both the manufacturing and agriculture schedules include detailed information about
inputs and outputs, making it possible to calculate different measures of productivity.
Manufacturing schedules show the value of capital investment and the quantities and values of
raw materials, labor, and products, making it possible to calculate both the total revenue and the
total cost of production and to use their ratio as a simple measure of total productivity in
manufacturing10.  We also calculate the value added per worker and average revenue of raw
materials as measures of the partial productivities of labor and material inputs.
Agriculture schedules similarly provide information about inputs and outputs, but the
information is not very detailed before 1870.  On the cost side, the schedules for 1850 and 1860
provide only the values of farms, farming implements and machinery, and livestock.  The estimate
of total cost is thus restricted to the user cost of capital only, which would make the comparisons
of total productivity less reliable if the proportion of omitted items to those included is not
identical between Shaker farms and others.  On the revenue side, the schedules provide only
earnings generated from orchard products, market gardens, home manufactures, and animals
slaughtered (or sold for slaughter).  The revenue of other products thus need to be estimated by
using market prices and the reported quantities that each farm produced11.  Agriculture censuses
of 1870 and 1880 provide more information.  For example, in both years farmers reported the
"estimated value of all farm productions (sold, consumed, or on hand)."  Furthermore,
                                                 
10.  Federal Government Bond yield for 1850 and Railroad Bond yields for 1860-80, as reported in Homer and
Sylla (1991: 287-88), are used as the rate of interest in calculating the user cost of capital.
11.  1860 prices are from Atack and Bateman (1987: 232-7).  For 1850, reliable prices are available for New York
and Cincinnati, as reported in Ronk (1936) and Berry (1943).  New York prices are used as proxies for prices in
11.
information about cost included the wages paid (for both 1870 and 1880), the cost of building and
repairing fences (for 1880 only), and the cost of fertilizers purchased (for 1880 only).
Similar to the estimation of productivity in manufacturing, we use the ratio of revenue to
cost as the measure of total productivity in agriculture.  Because the agricultural schedules do not
provide information about the quantity of labor, however, we cannot estimate its partial
productivity in agriculture.  The schedules nevertheless provide information about the quantity of
land, allowing for an estimate of the partial productivity of land (calculated as the ratio of total
revenue to the acres of improved land).
One might question the reliability of census data to estim te th  productivity of the
Shakers because of the potential biases generated by the peculiarities of communal organizations.
That the Shakers owned assets jointly and received non-monetary remuneration for their labor
raises several questions about the accuracy of some of the entries in the census schedules and thus
about the reliability of the estimates of their productivity.  For example, because the Shakers
owned assets in common and because by the 1850s they had owned the farms for a long time,
could it be that they did not know the current full market value of their land or that, even if they
knew the market value, they underreported it?  Similarly, because the Shakers did not receive
direct monetary payments for their communal labor, could it be that the quantities of labor
recorded in manufacturing schedules refer only to hired hands or that, even if the quantities refer
to the Shakers, the census schedules failed to record the cost of their labor accurately?  In such
cases, estimates of Shaker productivity would be biased, and the comparisons of their productivity
with those of other farmers would be misleading.
                                                                                                                                                    
the eastern states included in this study (Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire), and
Cincinnati prices for western states (Ohio, Kentucky).
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As we discuss in more detail in the Appendix, the tests we performed to address these
issues suggest that the census entries for the Shakers about the values of their land and the
quantities and cost of their labor are not significantly biased.  We find that the average value of
land was not significantly different between the Shaker farms and others.  We also believe that the
quantity of labor and wage figures enumerated for the Shakers reported, first, the number of
Shakers who worked in a particular shop and the hours they worked, and second, the
enumerators’ estimates of what these Shakers would have been paid for the same work had they
been hired hands.  We thus believe that the productivity estimates for the Shakers are not
significantly biased.
Table 1 reports the measures of manufacturing productivity per establishment and
agricultural productivity per farm, separately for the Shakers and other producers12.  In
manufacturing, there are no statistically significant differences (at conventional levels) between the
averages of the Shakers and other manufacturers in terms of either total productivity or the partial
productivities of labor and material inputs.  In agriculture, however, comparisons of average
productivity yield mixed results.  Whereas the average revenue of land was significantly greater on
Shaker farms in 1850 and there were no significant differences in average total productivity
between the two groups of farmers in 1850 and 1860, the Shaker farms were less productive in
1870 and 1880.
Determinants of Agricultural Productivity: What Caused the Difference in 1870 and 1880?
                                                 
12.  The decline in the revenue/cost ratios in agriculture for both groups of farmers after 1870 reflect both
additional items added to cost and the different methods of calculating revenue.  The decline in some of the
agricultural and manufacturing productivity measures between 1870 and 1880 may be attributed to the falling
prices of products between the two c nsus years.  There are no consistently significant regio al variations (in
absolute or relative terms) in productivity among different regions.
13.
Two main conclusions emerge from the comparisons of productivities between the
Shakers and other producers.  The first is that on average the Shaker manufacturing enterprises
were just as productive as the conventional ones.  The second, however, is that, whereas the
Shaker farms were equally (or more) productive as the conventional ones in 1850 and 1860, they
were less productive in 1870 and 1880.  The question then becomes whether it was the difference
in organizational form or something else that caused the difference in agricultural productivity in
1870 and 1880.  That is, rather than the organizational form, could it be other systematic
differences between the Shaker farms and others, for example in terms of the amounts and
compositions of inputs and outputs, that caused the observed differential in the revenue/cost
ratios during this period.  We thus need to identify significant non-organizational differences
between the Shaker farms and others and determine their effect on productivity.
In terms of inputs, because the Shakers operated farms primarily to meet the food needs of
large numbers of members, one would expect these farms to be larger in size than others.  Indeed,
as Table 2 shows, the amounts of both total land and capital investment (values of farm,
implements and machinery, and livestock) were much larger on Shaker farms than on others. In
terms of outputs, because the Shakers operated large communal farms that were more likely to be
engaged in subsistence agriculture, one would expect both the variety and the composition of
products to be different between the two types of farms.  As Table 2 shows, the Shakers
consistently produced a significantly greater number of products and a higher ratio of perishables
than other farms, confirming the expectation13.
                                                 
13.  Ratio of perishables is the share of income that came from butter, cheese, garden products, and orchard
products (as a percentage of income from 13 products--for consistency across censuses--that also includes wheat,
corn, rye, oats, potatoes, hay, peas and beans, wool, and animals slaughtered).
14.
What effect did these differences betwen the Shaker farms and others have on their
relative productivities?  To identify the determinants of agricultural productivity, we tested for the
effects on total productivity (revenue/cost ratio) of the amount of capital investment (values of
farm, implements and machinery, and livestock), capital intensity (capital/land ratio), number of
products, and ratio of perishables.  We also used a dummy variable (Shaker farms=1, others=0) to
test for the difference between the Shakers and others in the way each variable affected their
productivity.  By interacting each variable through its multiplication with the dummy variable, we
created new variables that would help us determine whether the effect of each variable was felt
differently by the Shaker farms and others.  Because tests for heteroscedasticity showed that error
variances were highly correlated with capital, we corrected for the problem by transforming
variables (divide by capital) and estimating the transformed regression equation.
Table 3 shows the results of the weighted least-squares procedure, reported in terms of
the coefficients corresponding to original variables.  The coefficients of dummy-transformed
variables are generally insignificant, except for ShakerxCapital which is significant at the 11%
level in 1850 and 1860 and less significant in 1870 and 1880.  The coefficients of non-interacted
terms are generally significant (though with exceptions) at conventional levels, and their signs are
consistent across the four censuses.  On the input side, the negative signs of capital and
capital/land ratio suggest that additional capital investment and capital intensity contributed more
to (capital) cost than to revenue14.  Th  positive sign (though less significant) of the differential
effect of capital (ShakerxCapital), however, suggests that the negative effect of capital was offset
to a degree on Shaker farms.  On the output side, the positive sign of the number of products
shows economies of scope in the way increased variety of products had a positive effect on
15.
agricultural productivity.  Higher ratio of perishables, on the other hand, had a negative effect.
One explanation could be that perishables might have been too labor-intensive and therefore
contributed at the margin a below average amount to the farm’s income.
Although the regression results do not change much over the four regressions (except for
the reduced significance of capital/land ratio in 1870 and ratio of perishables in 1880), combined
with the known systematic differences between the two types of farms, they provide an
explanation of the change in comparative productivity after 1870.  There are two noteworthy
systematic changes between 1850/60 and 1870/80, both having to do with capital.  The first is
that the capital differential between the Shaker farms and others increases significantly after 1870,
suggesting that the Shakers felt the negative effect of capital even more so during this period.  As
seen in Table 2, the amount of Shaker capital grew significantly both relative to the earlier period
and relative to their neighbors (from about 6 or 7 times greater in 1850/60 to about 9 or 10 times
greater in the later period).  Because of the significant and negative effect of capital on
productivity, the Shaker farms thus suffered proportionally much greater after 1870.15  The
second is that the interaction term of capital for the Shakers (Shaker x Capital), though not very
significant, becomes even less significant after 1870.  This suggests that, whereas the Shakers
were able to offset to a degree the overall negative effect of capital during 1850 and 1860, the
advantage vanished in 1870 and 188016.
                                                                                                                                                    
14.  The negative coefficients for capital variables are puzzling, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to address.
15.  Note also that the argument about the central role of capital in causing the productivity differential in 1870
and 1880 is consistent with the similarity in the partial productivity of land between the two groups during the
same period.  Average revenue of land, a measure that does not include the cost of capital, is greater for the
Shakers in 1850 and about the same between the two groups thereafter, suggesting that differences in total
productivity reflect the role of capital.
16.  Another significant change in the Shaker history of this period, which cannot be directly incorporated into our
quantitative analysis, is the sharp fall in Shaker membership and a change in its composition toward more females
and elderly (Bainbridge 1982, Brewer 1986). The Shakers thus had to hire large numbers of workers from outside
to meet seasonal labor needs on farms, which probably had a negative effect on the productivities of Shaker farms.
16.
Conclusion
Information contained in the enumeration schedules of the U. S. Agriculture and
Manufacturing Censuses provides an excellent opportunity to estimate the productivities of the
Shakers and to compare them with other producers randomly drawn from the same source of
data.  Our results show that the Shaker farms and shops generally performed just as productively
as other producers, with the exception of significantly lower Shaker total productivity in
agriculture in 1870 and 1880.  Identifying and controlling for non-organizational differences
between the two groups of farmers, we argue that the productivity difference in 1870 and 1880
can be attributed to the changing role of capital rather than differences in organizational form.
Our narrow focus on the Shakers and their neighbors has wider implications about the
comparative productivities of communes and conventional producers.  Using economic history to
clarify and test contemporary economic theory, we argue that, all else being equal, a communal
enterprise can be just as productive as a conventional one.  Although a communal enterprise
behaves differently in the way it distributes output to its members, this need not have an adverse
effect on its productivity.  Other unique features of a commune, such as unconventional
preferences or work attitudes of its members and the interdependence of their decisions, can help
to overcome the potential for reduced incentives to work hard.
                                                                                                                                                    
Any potential for incentive problems applied equally to the hired hands (who were paid a daily wage and whose
individual contributions to output could not be costlessly observed in team production), and the hired hands did not
share any commitment to Shaker goals or have any other stake in Shaker Society.  See Nordhoff (1875) for the
numbers of hired hands, as of mid-1870s, in different communities.
17.
Appendix
Discussion of the potential problems of using census data to estimate the productivities of
the Shakers and to compare with their neighbors:
a. Did the Shakers value their farms correctly?
 As Table 2 shows, there are no consistent and significant differences between Shaker
farms and others in terms of average land values, measured as the ratio of farm value to total
(improved + unimproved) land.
b. Could the quantity of labor recorded in census schedules refer to hired hands only?
As Table 2 shows, the capital/labor ratios in Shaker shops are not significantly different
from those in conventional firms.  If the labor figures referred only to hired hands, we would have
observed significantly higher ratios of capital to labor. Moreover, writers on the Shakers
frequently comment on the many unskilled hired hands in agriculture but not in manufacturing.
c. How are men and women counted in the calculation of value added per worker?
Men and women (and children in 1870 and 1880) are counted as equals in labor inputs.
This could potentially bias the comparison if the labor input between men and women and their
ratios between the two groups were both significantly different.  Although the Shaker shops in
general had a higher ratio of female workers, the differences are not significant enough to affect
the results.
d. Does the fact that the Shakers did not actually receive money wages significantly bias
the results?
The existence of information about both the quantity and cost of labor in the
manufacturing schedules suggests that for census purposes the Shakers provided an estimate of
the cost of their labor (possibly with the assistance of the enumerator who was presumably
18.
knowledgeable about the going wage rates in the area).  We tested for the accuracy of these
entries by using the average wages paid by other firms in each township and recalculating the cost
of labor in Shaker shops in the same township (that is, by multiplying these figures with the
quantities of labor recorded for Shaker shops).  This procedure is possible only for 1850 and
1860, because the 1870 and 1880 Censuses do not report the average monthly wages of males
and females separately.  By including the recalculated cost of labor in the total cost of Shaker
shops, we reach new revenue/cost ratios for the Shakers for 1850 and 1860: 1.33 and 1.23 (the
new t-statistics that test for the significance of their difference from the averages of other
producers are 0.33 and 0.67).  The difference between the new estimates for the Shakers and the
average ratios of non-Shaker shops still remains insignificant.
e. Does the exclusion of supervisory labor bias the results?
Census schedules do not provide separate information about the proprietor or the salaried
managers, and there are good reasons to believe that such labor was not included in the labor
figures (Atack 1985: 76-78 and Bateman and Weiss 1981: 109-13).  This would underestimate the
total labor cost and bias the revenue/cost ratios especially in small firms where the supervisory
cost can represent a significant portion of the total.  In order to test for this possibility,  we used a
procedure similar to that employed by Bateman and Weiss (1981: 109) by restricting the
comparison of productivities in 1850 and 1860 (during which the Shaker shops were significantly
smaller) to those firms with capital worth over $2,000.  In 1850, there were 34 such Shaker firms
with an average revenue/cost ratio of 1.19 and 49 other firms with 1.30.  In 1860, 18 large Shaker
firms averaged 1.16 and 33 other firms 1.30.  The t-statistic to test for the difference between the
averages of the Shaker and other firms were 1.14 in 1850 and 0.98 in 1860.  Although there is
thus a more noticeable difference between the productivities of the Shaker and other firms (as
19.
compared to the original revenue/cost ratios reported in Table 1), the difference is still statistically
insignificant at conventional levels.
f. How representative is the comparison sample of neighboring farms and shops?
To determine the representativeness of the firms in the comparison samples and at the
same time to control for local factors, we used published census summaries for each of the
seventeen counties (in seven states) that include Shaker communes.  We calculat d the county-
level values of the variables reported in Table 2 and the values of the t-statistics at test for the
significance of the differences between the averages of the counties and the comparison samples




Comparison of Average Productivity,
Shakers and Others
1850 1860 1870 1880
MANUFACTURING
Revenue/Cost Ratio
Shakers 1.35 1.26 1.62 1.61
Others 1.36 1.34 1.56 1.59
(0.10) (0.51) (0.33) (0.16)
Value Added per Worker
($/Worker)
Shakers 523.6 672.1 1384.4 883.8
Others 563.2 695.1 1539.5 841.4
(0.57) (0.12) (0.30) (0.18)
Average Revenue of Raw Materials (Output/Input)
Shakers 2.68 3.67 2.53 2.66
Others 2.91 3.63 2.91 2.50
(0.71) (0.03) (0.79) (0.47)
Sample Size
Shakers 64 48 32 46
Others 70 42 40 60
AGRICULTURE
Revenue/Cost Ratio
Shakers 3.42 3.41 1.79 1.24
Others 3.43 3.05 2.53 2.72
(0.01) (0.94) (2.73) (4.81)
Average Revenue of Land ($/Improved Acres)
Shakers 12.70 13.95 15.06 11.35
Others 8.22 11.66 15.91 11.62
(3.34) (1.17) (0.49) (0.15)
Sample Size
Shakers 42 38 36 34
Others 80 75 70 65
Notes:  See text for an explanation of the calculation of cost and revenue.
Figures in parentheses are the t-statistics that test for the difference between the two means.





Differences between the Averages of the Shakers and Other Producers
1850 1860 1870 1880
MANUFACTURING
Capital ($)
Shakers 1431.6 2148.6 3524.5 2956.4
Others 4221.4 3880.1 3871.9 2790.0
(2.23) (1.87) (0.23) (0.14)
Capital / Labor Ratio ($ / worker)
Shakers 576.6 914.8 1445.0 580.9
Others 753.7 664.9 846.7 866.8
(1.44) (1.06) (1.34) (1.71)
AGRICULTURE
Total Land (Improved + Unimproved Acres)
Shakers 870.3 1321.3 1148.5 1024.1
Others 174.0 136.7 119.8 101.8
(6.56) (5.29) (6.74) (9.75)
Value of Land (Farm Value / Total Acres)
Shakers 43.1 39.8 49.6 60.3
Others 40.6 46.7 69.6 60.6
(0.25) (0.97) (1.21) (0.02)
Capital ($)
Shakers 29998.4 38228.7 62155.0 52409.9
Others 5237.1 5262.0 6951.0 5228.4
(9.00) (8.99) (5.77) (10.58)
Capital / (Improved) Land Ratio ($ / Improved Acres)
Shakers 78.9 89.2 94.1 115.5
Others 59.1 72.2 82.5 88.5
(1.76) (1.52) (0.37) (1.60)
Number of Products
Shakers 13.2 13.0 11.9 12.2
Others 8.9 8.8 7.7 7.6
(8.81) (9.20) (6.23) (8.10)
Ratio of Perishables
Shakers 0.32 0.31 0.20 0.27
Others 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.22
(6.99) (5.65) (2.51) (1.44)
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are the t-statistics that test for the difference
between the two means.






Determinants of Agricultural Productivity
Variable 1850 1860 1870 1880
Constant 1.74 3.90 2.00 2.82
(2.04) (5.86) (8.40) (4.33)
Shakera -3.58 -1.64 -0.85 -0.62
(0.43) (0.45) (0.41) (0.02)
Capital -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005
(2.95) (3.68) (2.62) (2.64)
Shaker x Capital 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005
(1.61) (1.62) (1.37) (1.15)
Capital / Land Ratio -0.004 -0.012 -0.002 -0.007
(0.80) (6.19) (1.40) (2.46)
Shaker x Capital/Land Ratio 0.010 0.011 -0.003 0.003
(0.26) (0.28) (0.05) (0.02)
Number of Products 0.48 0.10 0.33 0.37
(5.83) (1.25) (7.94) (4.73)
Shaker x Number of Products -0.11 0.33 -0.27 -0.38
(0.19) (0.81) (0.82) (0.11)
Ratio of Perishables -5.95 -4.20 -4.23 -1.49
(3.97) (3.03) (4.19) (1.64)
Shaker x Ratio of Perishables 10.67 -5.35 9.03 2.48
(1.26) (0.68) (0.84) (0.05)
N 122 113 106 99
F 51.9 60.5 44.6 57.4
R2 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.85
a: Dummy variable that assigns 1 to Shaker establishments and 0 to others.
Notes: The revenue/cost ratio is used as the productivity proxy.
Figures in parentheses are the t-statistics.
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